Sum m ary. T he paper reports an attem pt to estim ate the deter minants of entry in G reek m anufacturing industry in the 1984± 87 perio d and to identify the differe nces betw een locatio nal entry prefere nces. E ntry in Athens is found to be hesita nt with respect to factor s such as pro® tability and increase d competitio n. Conversely , entry in the rest of the country is strongly relate d to expected pro® ts and safe m arkets, negativel y affecte d by relativ e labour costs and indiffere nt to international com petitio n threats. The`healthier' approac h of regiona l entry is enhancing regio nal develop m ent prospects and partly justi® es the strict regional policie s of the 1980s.
Introduction
Entry plays an im portant role in determining the structure of industry and consequently its conduct and performance. It also affects the growth prospects of the sector and of the speci® c markets, regional or national, where it occurs. Thus, it may be considered as highly im portant for regional developm ent and prosperity. 1 The scope of this paper is to examine the factors affecting entry in Greek manufacturing industry, and to search for any differences between locational entry preferences. Due to lack of available data, only differences between the main urban centre of Greece, namely Athens, and the rest of the country will be considered. Such differences, if any, would be stimulating to detect since they may provid e an explanation for regional im balances and hints for future prospects.
The annual entry rate for the whole of the country in the 1984 ±87 period is 20 per centÐ i.e. each year, 20 new ® rms enter the manufacturing sector for every 100 existing ones. Of the 20 entries, 4 take place in Athens (20 per cent of new entrants) while the remaining 16 take place in the rest of the country (80 per cent of new entrants). The difference in the entry numbers between Athens and the rest of Greece im plies that the determinants of entry may be different and hence interesting to examine.
In section 2 of the paper we explain the model to be used; in section 3 we present the empirical ® ndings ; and in section 4 the conclusions.
M odel and Data
There has been a lot of research on entry models, the most popular remaining the model by Orr (1974 ) with different extensions (Duetsch, 1975 (Duetsch, , 1984 Khemani and H. Louri and V. Anagnostaki Shapiro, 1986 ; M cDonald, 1986 ; High® eld and Sm iley, 1987 ; Baldwin and Gorecki, 1987; Lieberman, 1987 ; Schwalbach, 1987 ; Shapiro and Khemani, 1987 ; Storey and Jones, 1987 ; Smiley, 1988 ; Acs & Audretsch, 1989; Geroski, 1991 a; M ayer and Chappel, 1992) . The model assumes that entry, E, like any investment decision depends on risk and return criteria. The return is determined by pro® t and growth expectations, while risk is in¯uenced by the barriers that incumbent ® rms can raise to deter entry (Caves and Porter, 1977 ; Hilke, 1984; Smiley, 1988 ; Geroski et al., 1990 ; Geroski, 1991b) . The barriers depend, in their turn, on behavioural, structural, labour market, foreign trade and other characteristics of the speci® c sector where entry occurs. Thus, the entry equation can be speci® ed as follows:
where P* is expected pro® ts; GR is the rate of growth; SI is the relative size of the market; KR is capital requirements; BR is business risk; CN is the degree of concentration; AD is advertising expenditures; W S is the wage share in value added; W A is the relative cost of labour; SK is skill requirements; IM is the im port penetration; and EX is the ratio of exports to sales of each sector. All other unkno wn factors are included in u. Entry data in Greece are rare and when locational entry preferences are required, they becom e even scantier. The National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) keeps a record of all new establishm ents in the country, disaggregated by location into tw o categories: Athens and rest of Greece. The new establishments included must invest in machinery of more than 15 HP which means that the ® rms taken into account are of medium and large size. Unfortun ately, only their number is known. No information on invested assets or other size proxy is available. For the 1984 ±87 period, the data were collected with no major changes in the sample criteria and the information was further disaggregated in the 20 2-digit manufacturing sectors annually. Thus 76 observations were available.
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Entry was tried in different forms, such as absolute numbers or their logs, but the one adopted in the ® nal estimation is the ratio of new establishm ents over the total number of medium and large ® rms in each sector. The Sargan' s maximum likeliho od test (Sargan, 1964 ) was used for the choice of the most relevant speci® cation.
For expected pro® ts, four different formulations of expectations were tried: lagged, i.e. P* 5 P 2 1; adaptive, i.e. P* 5 v o (1 2 v ) j P 2 j; rational with perfect foresight, i.e. P 5 P 1 j, j $ 1; and static, i.e. P* 5 P. The best results were given by lagged expectations and they are the ones reported in Table  1 . P* is the log of gross pro® ts lagged by one year as publish ed by the Statistical Service of the Confederation of Greek Industries (CGI).
GR is the annual growth rate of each sector' s employment. The growth rate of sales and total assets were also tried. None was signi® cant and the last tw o seemed to suffer from in¯ation problems. Therefore employment growth was ® nally used. SI measures the relative size of the sector in terms of value added with respect to value added by industry as a whole. The larger the size of the sector, the larger the replacement effectÐ i.e. the more ® rms enter and leave the sector. Both variables are publish ed by the NSSG .
KR is capital requirements which should be a barrier to entry, since the higher the capital required for an establishment the less ® rms would be willing to enter. There are no data available on capital to ® t our sample.
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Therefore productivity was tried as a proxy thinkin g that the higher the capital used the higher productivity should be. Productivity data are collected by the CGI.
BR is measured by the standard deviation of pro® tability in the last 4 years, divided by the average pro® tability in the same period. CN is the share of the four largest ® rms of each sector in terms of employment. AD is T able 1. E ntry in Greek m anufactu ring industry : A then s and the rest of Greece, 1984±87 the ratio of advertising expenditures over sales. The source for CN and AD is the NSSG . The labour factor introdu ces three new variables in the entry equation. W S is the ratio of salaries and wages over value added. W A is the ratio of the average wage of each sector over the average wage of manufacturing industry. Finally, SK is the ratio of skilled personnel over total employment in the sector. The source is again the NSSG.
IM is the percentage of relevant domestic demand satis® ed by im ports, while EX is the percentage of sales which is exported. The ® rst series of data is provide d by the Bank of Greece and the second by the NSSG. In 1985 an austerity programme was introduced which strongly affected the business environ ment. The cost of capital was increased; a strict incomes policy was introduced affecting the cost of labour; demand and pro® t expectations changed; im ports and exports were heavily affected either by direct measures such as quotas or extra duties or by the devaluation of currency. In order to test for changes in the entry decisions and the consequent instability of the estimated coef® cients, a Chow test was performed. The F values were 1.01 for Athens, 2.35 for the rest of the country and 1.93 for Greece. They were smaller than the critical values of F with 13 and 50 DOF at 5 per cent and 1 per cent which were 1.95 and 2.50 respectively. Therefore stability is assumed to have prevailed through out the period examined. Apparently entry decisions followed the changes in the independent variables but withou t structural breakage. The austerity`shock' was not strong enough to cause discontinuit ies in the entry decisions.
Empirical Findings
M ost coef® cients are signi® cant in the aggregate equation. Expected pro® ts are found to affect the entry decision in a positive way, as expected. Unexpected is the signi® cantly positiv e effect of concentration on entry which remained positiv e in all three cases. Concentration is though t to be a deterrent for entry, since it makes collusion easier and predatory behaviour more feasible (Schwalbach, 1991) . The explanation may be that entry occurs in highly concentrated sectors because the large and possibly colludin g ® rms set the (high) prices which new and small ® rms adopt. Newcomers are, at least initially, followers of the`price setters' and belong to the market fringe. 4 The positiv e sign of the wage share in value added is not unreasonable, since it is well known that new establishm ents occur in labour-intensive sectorsÐ which remains a structural problem for Greek industry. It is the light and labour-intensive sectors, such as food and beverages, textiles, apparel and footwear, leather and fur, that attract more entries and grow faster than capital-intensive and high-tech ones; the result being the continuation of an unfavourable structure for Greek industry in view of the integrated European market of the late 1990 s which calls for a more balanced manufacturing production. It should be stressed that the effect is the same in Athens and the rest of the country; which means that despite the application of an industrial policy with a regional dimension in the 1980s, no differences in the sectoral entry preferences were observed.
The relative wage is found to affect entry in a signi® cantly negative way. It is not unusual for entry to avoid sectors with relatively high labour cost. How ever, it is the light sectors that employ cheaper labour and the negative sign stresses once again the structural bias of entry towards the light side of industry.
Import penetration is found to have a positively signi® cant effect which is rather the opposite of what was expected. Sectors with high im port penetration attract more entries, maybe because im ports are a sign of strong demand and relatively high prices of the sector' s products. Imports may be considered as a sign of a healthy market demand-wise and may therefore be preferred for a less risky entry. The sign remains positiv e for the threes cases, but the Athens effect is much smaller.
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It is questionable why growth and size did not have any signi® cant im pact anywhere. One explanation may be that all the in¯uence of future prospects on entry is represented only by pro® t expectations. Skill requirements, export share and business risk did not seem to affect the entry decision signi® cantly either. Capital requirements were not signi® cant but the lack of good data may be responsible for that. In any case, it is not unreasonable since entrants seem to be attracted by labour-in tensive and not capitalintensive sectors. The former require much less investment; hence the`sunk cost' effect on entry, represented by capital requirements, is negligibleÐ adding to the argument that entry is biased towards light sectors with low capital needs.
The main differences between entry in Athens and the rest of Greece lie with the expected pro® ts and the export share effects. Pro® t expectations do not seem to affect much the entry decision in Athens (small coef® cient and signi® cant only at 10 per cent) which means that ® rms established in Athens may do so for other reasons, such as proximity to the market or other infrastructure facilities, availability of labour or in general the existence of urbanisation economies (Louri, 1988) . It should be stressed that the negative relative wage effect in Athens is very small, probably because availability of labour is easier and cheaper there. Conversely, ® rms established in the rest of Greece seem to take into account very seriously both pro® t expectations and the relative cost of labour, as should be expected.
The negative effect of export share for Athens may mean that entrants are negatively affected by the existence of high exportsÐ probably because they consider them as a sign of exceedingly com petitive markets. New ® rms may ® nd it dif® cult to try to survive in such an internationally com petitive environ ment. Entrant ® rms in the rest of Greece perceive export share as non-signi® cant either because they are not interested in exports or because they do not consider internationally competitive sectors as a threat for their success.
The general idea coming out of the results presented in Table 1 is that, as far as regional entry preferences are concerned, ® rms established in Athens show a relative disrespect for pro® tability and a strong aversion towards internationally competitive markets. The relative wage effect is rather small and skill requirements have a negative in¯uence on entry.
Entrants in the rest of the country consider expected pro® ts as highly signi® cant and are not in¯uenced by international competition, while they prefer secure sectors with high concentration, high im port penetration and high labour share (Fritsch, 1992) . In a sense it seems that entrants in the rest of the country have a more sound rationale for their decision, while entrants in Athens are dif® cult to interpret with the usual entry determinants. Sim ilar conclusions are reached by other researchers (Kottis, 1980 ; Katochianou, 1984 ) using much earlier data and different methods of analysis.
It may be the case that urbanisation economies or even personal preferences play a more signi® cant role than the usual factors given by entry theory (Norton, 1992) . It may also be the case that regional entrants have a healthier attitude towards investment decisions which may be due to an encouraging but strict regional-industrial policy applied in the 1980 s in Greece. If the`healthier' approach is related to the four times higher rate of entry in the rest of Greece as compared to Athens, then regional industrial development seems to have good prospects.
An additional point is based on the negative effect of the relative wage as combined with the insigni ® cance of capital requirements. Such an association could give policy-makers a warning that labour subsidies may be more relevant than capital ones for a successful regional policy in the future (Tatsos, 1990 ). This suggestion should not hold if an industrial policy with emphasis on capitalintensive or high-tech sectors is adopted .
Conclusions
Entry in manufacturing industry is a determinant of its structure and performance. It also affects regional developm ent in the sense that new, healthy ® rms promote industrial growth, employment and income-making regions independent of the centre' s`protection' and capable of sustaining a decent standard of living.
By examining the different factors which are thought to affect the entry decision, it was found that entrant ® rms in Athens had a more hesitant approach to factors related to pro® tability and increased competition . On the other hand, entrant ® rms in the rest of the country showed strong interest in expected pro® tability, preference to safe markets and indifference to threats posed by international com petition. Both are negatively affected by the relative cost of labour, with the periphery showing a much stronger response. At the same time, both are not affected by capital requirements. The two results could suggest that labour subsidies instead of capital ones may be more relevant for regional development.
No prospects of changes in the Greek industrial structure are evident in either location, which is a negative sign for its evolution . Even so, it seems to be the case that entry in the periphery not only is larger but it also responds to healthier criteria showing an increasing dynamism. It remains to be seen in the near future if regional developm ent will be enhanced by such preferences. The signs given by the present analysis are rather positiv e. and it is conside red as a specia l case of a heavil y oligopol istic market facin g decreasing demand. Therefor e w e decide d not to includ e it in our sam ple; 76 observa tion s rem ained. 3. The only data on capita l disaggre gate d at 2-digi t m anufact uring secto r level are collected by the CGI. The sourc e is the balanc e sheets of corporat ions where capita l appear s at historic , i.e. acquisit ion, cost. Since no inform atio n is availabl e on the speci® c year of each acquisiti on, capita l canno t be de¯ated and therefor e it canno t be transferred into any comparabl e units and used in econo metric estimations . 4. It should be notice d that when the sam e regressi on was run w ith aggrega te data referring only to larg e size entrie s national ly, the concentr ation effect was negative . Apparently larg e ® rm s are takin g into accoun t the possibili ty of collusio n and predator y behaviour by incu mbents, while m ediu m-size d ® rms include d in our sample are satis ® ed to belong to the fring e and follo w the larg e price-set ters' policie s w hich m ay guarant ee enoug h pro® ts for them . The annua l entry ratio of large ® rm s is 8 per cent, while the entry ratio in our sam ple is 20 per cent. Unfortuna tely , the large entry data are not disaggre gate d regional ly. 5. It should be stresse d again that when the sam e regressi on is run with aggrega te data from large-si ze entries , the im port penetration effect is negativ e w hile the export share one is positive . One explana tion may be that larg e ® rm s avoid sector s that are heavil y penetrat ed by im ports and therefor e probabl y saturate d and not able to absorb their larg e producti on potentia l. For the opposite reasons , they prefe r sectors with increase d export potentia l. For the mediu m ® rms include d in our sam ple, im port penetrat ion means apparen tly that the marke t is safer dem and-wise, w hile they do not try their luck in exports bein g afraid of or incapabl e of facin g internat ional com petition .
